Judging the Limits of Cooperative Federalism by Adams, Eric M.




Volume 76 (2016) Article 2
Judging the Limits of Cooperative Federalism
Eric M. Adams
University of Alberta, Faculty of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr
Part of the Law Commons
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Supreme
Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Adams, Eric M.. "Judging the Limits of Cooperative Federalism." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases
Conference 76. (2016).
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol76/iss1/2
Judging the Limits of Cooperative 
Federalism 
Eric M. Adams* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I have often wondered whether the history of Canadian constitutional 
law might best be taught by traversing a footbridge of metaphors. In the 
“Two Row Wampum”1 of treaty relations, the “compact”2 of 
Confederation, the “watertight compartments”3 and “balance”4 of the 
division of powers, the “living tree”5 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms,6 and the “architecture”7 of our parliamentary structures, 
Canada’s Constitution has found expression in constructs of the 
imagination as much as commands of the text.8 Discerning meaning from 
abstract constitutional provisions invariably requires a turn to external 
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1 John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2010), at 75-76. See also Mark Walters, “Brightening the Covenant Chain: Aboriginal Treaty 
Meanings in Law and History after Marshall” (2001) 24 Dal. L.J. 75. 
2 Norman Rogers, “The Compact Theory of Confederation” (1931) 9 Can. Bar Rev. 395. 
On its revival as metaphor see Sébastien Grammond, “Compact is Back: The Revival of the 
Compact Theory of Confederation by the Supreme Court” (2016) 53:3 Osgoode Hall L.J. 
3 Canada (Attorney General) v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1937] A.C. 326, at 354, 
[1937] 1 D.L.R. 673 (P.C.). 
4 Reference re Firearms Act, [2000] S.C.J. No. 31, 2000 SCC 31, at para. 4 (S.C.C.),  
affg [1998] A.J. No. 1028, 1998 ABCA 305 (Alta. C.A.). 
5 Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.), affg [1983] 
A.J. No. 715, 147 D.L.R. (3d) 420 (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter “Hunter v. Southam”] citing Edwards v. 
Canada (Attorney General), [1930] A.C. 124, at 136, [1930] 1 D.L.R. 98 (P.C.), revg [1928] S.C.J. 
No. 19, [1928] S.C.R. 276 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Edwards”]. 
6 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
7 Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6, [2014] S.C.J. No. 21, 2014 SCC 21, at para. 
100 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6”]. 
8 See generally Warren J. Newman, “Of Castles and Living Trees: The Metaphorical and 
Structural Constitution” (2015) 9 J. Parliamentary & Pol. L. 471 and Hugo Cyr, “Conceptual 
Metaphors for an Unfinished Constitution” (2014) 19 Rev. Const. Stud. 1. 
28 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
principles and ideas to guide interpretation and to shape a larger 
constitutional story of purpose.9 Metaphors, norms, unwritten principles 
and narratives will always play a crucial role in constructing meaning in 
Canadian constitutional law. The question is not should courts turn to 
constitutional metaphors to guide constitutional interpretation — they 
will and must as a function of the interpretive role demanded of them — 
but rather what is the appropriate use of such metaphors in constitutional 
adjudication. 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s recently divided decision, Quebec 
(Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General),10 is the latest chapter 
in a long history concerning the legal regulation of firearms in Canada,11 
but its lasting contribution to Canadian constitutional law may well be as 
a battle over the meaning of cooperative federalism. At its heart, the case 
poses a novel constitutional question: can federal legislation repealing an 
intra vires statute itself be ultra vires? The controversy arose in response 
to Parliament’s attempt to repeal portions of the Firearms Act, dismantle 
its registry, and destroy its records.12 Seeking to enact a provincial 
firearms registry of its own, Quebec challenged the constitutionality of 
the federal law; specifically, the provisions providing for the destruction 
of data in relation to Quebec firearms owners. Among its various 
arguments about the ultra vires nature of the repeal scheme and Canada’s 
refusal to hand over registry information, Quebec invoked the idea of 
cooperative federalism as a barrier to unilateral federal action.13 
Before contrasting the different conceptions of cooperative federalism 
at work in the majority and dissenting judgments, this article briefly lays 
out how the interpretation of constitutions, like the search for meaning 
within all sets of rules, necessarily engages external, often metaphorical, 
references. A brief sketch of Canadian constitutional history reveals the 
ubiquity of metaphorical constitutional thought. Despite their practical 
necessity in matters of constitutional interpretation, I argue nonetheless 
                                                                                                                       
9 Eric M. Adams, “Canadian Constitutional Identities” (2015) 38 Dal. L.J. 311. 
10 [2015] S.C.J. No. 14, 2015 SCC 14 (S.C.C.), affg [2013] J.Q. no 6676 (Que. C.A.) 
[hereinafter “Quebec v. Canada”]. 
11 See R. Blake Brown, Arming and Disarming: A History of Gun Control in Canada 
(Toronto: The Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2012). 
12 Ending the Long-gun Registry Act, S.C. 2012 c. 6, amending the Firearms Act, S.C. 1995,  
c. 39. 
13 The Attorney General of Quebec argued in its factum: “Le refus du Canada est en 
contradiction … des principes structuraux de la Constitution canadienne, dont celui du fédéralisme 
coopératif.” Mémoire de L’Appelant, Procureur Général du Quebec et Procureur Général du 
Canada, at para. 14. 
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that constitutional metaphors have important adjudicative limits that 
must be respected. The dissenting judgment in Quebec v. Canada reveals 
the theoretical and practical difficulties of relying on what the dissent 
calls “the spirit of co-operative federalism”14 to generate substantive 
constitutional commitments. As important as metaphor is to our 
conception of constitutional law, we must be careful, however “strong its 
pull may be”, not to be swept “out to sea” in its rhetorical wake.15 
Understanding the mechanics of metaphor and its power to lead, but also 
to lead astray, may help us to adroitly steer the ship. 
II. CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL METAPHORS 
To apply the law to concrete cases is to interpret the meaning of words 
and phrases. To account for the inherent indeterminacy of language, the 
common law has developed practices of interpretation that look to overall 
purpose, background context, and extra-textual principles to determine 
precise and particular meaning when applying statutory or judicial 
language to real circumstances.16 Interpreting the meaning of vehicle in 
light of a particular legal purpose is necessary, for example, to determine 
which vehicles are truly banned from the park — cars, strollers, or military 
monuments — to borrow the famous examples from the Hart-Fuller 
debate.17 If reliance on purpose, context, and principle is necessary in 
interpreting statutes, the need is even more pronounced in constitutional 
law. Constitutions, necessarily drafted “with an eye to the future”, are 
especially abstract and indeterminate in order to provide “a continuing 
framework for the legitimate exercise of governmental power”.18 In order 
to endure and to enhance its legitimacy as supreme law, a constitution must 
be capable of governing the unanticipated, the changed and the new. 
Drafters select abstract constitutional language and concepts — think of 
property, equality, or unreasonable delay — to apply broadly to future 
developments and, in doing so, create possibilities for multiple meanings, 
divergent paths, and different outcomes. External references to larger 
animating ideas, ideals and purposes provide context in order to narrow the 
                                                                                                                       
14 Supra, note 10, at para. 149. 
15 Reference re Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, 2011 SCC 66, at para. 62 (S.C.C.). 
16  Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] S.C.J. No. 2, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27 at para. 21 
(S.C.C.), varg [1995] O.J. No. 586 (Ont. C.A.); Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6, supra, 
note 7, at para. 63. 
17 Fred Schauer “A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park” (2008) 83 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1109. 
18 Hunter v. Southam, supra, note 5, at 155. 
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ranges of acceptable meanings in order to determine, for instance, whether 
a constitution envisages substantive or formal equality in the entrenchment 
of equality rights. In this respect, constitutional metaphors are a compass 
to assist in reading the map of constitutional text. As a character in Zia 
Haider Rahman’s recent novel observes, “when the ancients saw clusters 
of stars in the sky, they joined them up in an order that evoked a shape they 
already recognized, something that held a meaning for them, and into this 
configuration they read properties of the celestial night.”19 Like ancients 
gazing at the night sky, judges interpret the meaning of constitutions by 
finding constellations of meaningful and familiar forms. 
The judicial impulse to look to constitutional metaphor — to connect 
constitutional provisions to external images and larger systems of 
understanding — goes well beyond the practicalities of legal interpretation. 
Metaphorical thinking and expression appears intrinsic to human thought 
and speech alike. “[M]etaphor,” I.A. Richards reminds us in his classic 
study, “is the omnipresent principle of language”.20 “[M]etaphor is 
pervasive in everyday life”, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson elaborate, 
“not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual 
system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally 
metaphorical in nature.”21 Forming associations and patterns between the 
concrete and the abstract, Steven Pinker argues, is intrinsic to language, 
and to rational and creative human thought itself.22 “Metaphor”, Jeffery 
Donaldson agrees, “is both a form and a process. Like electricity, it is not 
so much a thing as the way things behave … . [I]t is the root and manner 
of imaginative thinking.”23 Given the imperatives of lawyers and judges 
not only to interpret, but also to defend those interpretations and 
                                                                                                                       
19 Zia Haider Rahman, In the Light of What We Know (New York: Picardor, 2014), at 40. 
20 I.A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), at 92 
[hereinafter “Richards”]. 
21 George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1980), at 3 [hereinafter “Lakoff & Johnson”]. 
22 Steven Pinker, How the Mind Works (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1997). As Pinker 
explains elsewhere, “Conceptual metaphors point to an obvious way in which people could learn to 
reason about new, abstract concepts. They would notice … a parallel between a physical realm they 
already understand and a conceptual realm they don’t yet understand.” Emphasizing the ability to 
make and comprehend metaphor as a key evolutionary step in human intelligence, Pinker asks us to 
imagine the power when the mental mechanics of basic reasoning “cut themselves loose from actual 
hunks of matter … . The cognitive machinery that computes relations among things, places, and 
causes could then be co-opted for abstract ideas. The ancestry of abstract thinking would be visible 
in concrete metaphors, a kind of cognitive vestige.” The Stuff of Thought: Language as a Window 
Into Human Nature (New York: Penguin, 2007), at 241-42. 
23 Jeffery Donaldson, Missing Link: The Evolution of Metaphor and the Metaphor of 
Evolution (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015), at 9. 
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persuade others of them, it is no surprise that metaphor — with its 
succinct ability to capture and convey an idea visually, creatively and 
memorably — often plays a central role in law as in all rhetorical fields. 
The need for judges to invoke larger animating ideas and principles in 
division of powers jurisprudence — often expressed metaphorically — 
was apparent from the outset. In Parsons, still cited for its influential 
definitions of property and civil rights and trade and commerce, Sir 
Montague Smith conceded that the literal meaning of the words of 
sections 91(2) and 92(13) alone could not provide an answer.24 Rather, he 
averred, constitutional interpretation must draw meaning from what he 
later termed the “general scheme of the British North America Act”25 and 
the larger purposes and legislative intentions that it evidenced.26 The 
meaning and scope of individual heads of power could only be realized 
when understood collectively as a system, a division of powers, a 
federalism in which each head of power must exist in combination with 
the others. Interpretations of particular heads of power came to 
presuppose the continued and essential existence of the other heads of 
power in order to protect an essential balance of both federal and 
provincial power.  
It was precisely the spirit of that overall federal scheme that supported 
the Privy Council’s confident assertion in Hodge that the “true character 
and position of the provincial legislatures” was one of coordinate 
autonomy and equal supremacy to that of the federal government.27 In 
the period before the Privy Council’s vilification at the hands of 
progressive nationalists like Bora Laskin and Frank Scott,28 its 
federalism jurisprudence was praised by Canada’s leading constitutional 
scholar and historian, W.P.M. Kennedy, for “gradually bringing to light 
the essentially federal nature of the Canadian Constitution”, and for 
“humanizing” the Constitution “with the elasticity of life”.29 Interpreting 
the constitutional division of powers has always signalled more than a 
mechanical allocation of power: it expressed and drew upon an abstract 
idea and ideal of Canada; a lens through which the provisions of the text 
                                                                                                                       
24 Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons (1881), 7 App. Cas. 96 (P.C.). 
25 Russell v. The Queen (1882), 7 App. Cas. 829, at 836 (P.C.). 
26 Supra, note 24. 
27 Hodge v. The Queen (1883), 9 App. Cas. 117, at 132 (P.C.). 
28 R.C.B. Risk, “The Scholars and the Constitution: POGG and the Privy Council” in 
R.C.B. Risk, A History of Canadian Legal Thought: Collected Essays, G. Blaine Baker & J. Phillips, 
eds. (Toronto: The Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2006), at 233. 
29 W.P.M. Kennedy, The Constitution of Canada: An Introduction to its Development and 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1922), at 422, 431. 
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could be read with greater clarity; a constitutional ideal that eventually 
found succinct expression in the metaphor of balance. 
On many occasions, the broader constitutional ideas judges turned to 
found their greatest resonance when framed as metaphors. Lord Sankey 
did so most famously in declaring that the Constitution had “planted in 
Canada a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural 
limits”30 just a few years before Lord Atkin reminded that the “ship of 
state” still retained “the watertight compartments which are an essential 
part of her original structure”.31 Whether in approbation or derision, both 
images have proved indelible in Canadian constitutional law and culture. 
It is the metaphors that we remember and quote after the particular facts 
and holdings of the cases that gave rise to them have faded. Indeed, the 
particular power of such metaphors gave Lord Sankey pause. In the 
Aeronautics Reference, though he again insisted that constitutional 
interpretation required consideration of the “foundation upon which the 
whole structure was subsequently erected”, he cautioned that there was 
“always a danger that in the course of this process the terms of the statute 
may come to be unduly extended and attention diverted from what has 
been enacted to what has been judicially said about the enactment.”32 
This tension between constitutional words on the page and constitutional 
images in the mind has been an enduring dynamic in Canadian 
constitutional law. The challenge, as it turns out, has not been in 
conjuring a suitable roster of constitutional metaphors, but in controlling 
their capacity to reshape the constitutional text from which they emerge. 
As we have seen, the division of powers already possessed basic 
normative content by the time the term “federalism” itself began to 
appear in Canadian legal decisions. Perhaps not surprisingly, Rand J. was 
the first to use the expression in any Canadian court (although use of the 
term federalism had been common in constitutional scholarship and the 
political science literature for decades). In Saumur, Rand J. opined that 
legislation must be “sufficiently definite and precise to indicate its 
subject matter” in order for courts to determine its constitutionality. 
“That principle”, he noted, “inheres in the nature of federalism; 
otherwise, authority, in broad and general terms, could be conferred 
                                                                                                                       
30 Edwards, supra, note 5, at 136. 
31 Canada (Attorney General) v. Ontario (Attorney General), supra, note 3, at para. 15. 
32 Reference Re Regulations and Control of Aeronautics, [1932] A.C. 54, [1932] 1 D.L.R. 
58, at 70 (P.C.), revg [1930] S.C.J. No. 35 (S.C.C.). 
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which would end the division of powers.”33 Federalism, in addition to 
creating relations between levels of government, also operated as a check 
on potential governmental abuse of power. Justice Rand extended this 
conception of federalism in the implied bill of rights jurisprudence in the 
decade that followed. In a series of cases, Rand J. framed the Canadian 
Constitution as a “pattern of limitations, curtailments and modifications” 
designed to protect a never fully defined roster of individual rights and 
freedoms.34 Although the substantive contributions of Rand J.’s implied 
bill of rights never fully took hold and were certainly eclipsed by the 
Charter, the language of federalism did survive, a permanent reflection of 
the idea that the division of powers embodied a larger vision of 
democracy, diversity and good governance.  
While the prominent place of unwritten principles in the Secession 
Reference surprised many observers, the identification of federalism 
among the four foundational features of constitutionalism recognized by 
the Court did not. “The principle of federalism”, the Court explained, 
“recognizes the diversity of the component parts of Confederation, and 
the autonomy of provincial governments” while facilitating “democratic 
participation by distributing power to the government thought to be most 
suited to achieving the particular societal objective having regard to this 
diversity.”35 Those values, the Court argued, although not altogether 
visible in “the written provisions of the Constitution”, provided the 
“light” by which the text should be interpreted.36 
But federalism has always been capable of an array of descriptive and 
normative qualities, its precise calibration of powers subject to 
reasonable disagreement. Even apart from the often different shades of 
meaning and characteristics of federalism in scholarship and political 
thought emanating from English and French Canada, political scientists 
have described a range of different kinds of federalism (open, 
asymmetrical, executive, collaborative, to name only a few), each with 
                                                                                                                       
33 Saumur v. Quebec (City), [1953] S.C.J. No. 49, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, at 333 (S.C.C.), 
revg [1952] B.R. 475 ext (Que. Q.B.). A year later, Rand J. held: “The mutilation by a province of a 
federal undertaking is obviously not to be tolerated in our scheme of federalism”: Campbell-Bennett 
Ltd. v. Comstock Midwestern Ltd., [1954] S.C.J. No. 14, [1954] S.C.R. 207, at 216 (S.C.C.), affg 
[1953] 3 D.L.R. 594 (B.C.C.A.). 
34 Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.J. No. 13, [1957] S.C.R. 285, at 303 (S.C.C.), revg [1954] 
B.R. 421 (Que. Q.B.). See generally, Eric M. Adams “Building a Law of Human Rights: Roncarelli 
v. Duplessis in Canadian Constitutional Culture” (2010) 55 McGill L.J. 437. 
35 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 58 
(S.C.C.). 
36 Id., at para. 55. 
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distinct properties and political ramifications.37 Into this complex of 
labels emerged the idea of “cooperative federalism”, a genial-sounding 
description premised on federal and provincial governments working 
collectively to achieve mutual policy objectives. It did not take long for 
cooperative federalism to migrate from descriptive political science into 
normative constitutional law. Others have well canvassed the concept’s 
introduction and rise to prominence, starting with Laskin C.J.C.’s 
response to an intervener argument in the Anti-Inflation Reference that 
“[c]o-operative federalism may be consequential upon a lack of federal 
legislative power, but it is not a ground for denying it.”38 In the 40 years 
since, Laskin C.J.C.’s instinct that cooperative federalism was simply a 
matter of legislative practicalities and not law has been difficult to 
sustain. While continuing to recognize that much of the nature of the 
relationship between the federal and provincial governments lies beyond 
judicial concern, the Supreme Court also recognizes that “constitutional 
doctrine must facilitate, not undermine what this Court has called ‘co-
operative federalism’”.39 In Reference re Securities Act, a unanimous 
Court noted that the growing “practice” of “seeking cooperative 
solutions that meet the needs of the country as a whole as well as its 
constituent parts” had become the “animating force” of the “federalism 
principle upon which Canada’s constitutional framework rests”.40 Indeed, 
Hugo Cyr argues that Canadian federalism in any meaningful sense must 
be synonymous with cooperative federalism.41 “Today’s constitutional 
landscape”, Abella J. writes, “is painted with the brush of co-operative 
federalism.”42 
Less obviously than living trees and watertight compartments, 
cooperative federalism is a metaphor too. Federalism — itself an 
                                                                                                                       
37 On various stages and types of federal arrangements in the post-war period see David 
Cameron & Richard Simeon, “Intergovernmental Relations in Canada: The Emergence of 
Collaborative Federalism” (2002) 32:2 Publius: The Journal of Federalism 49. 
38 Re: Anti-Inflation Act (Canada), [1976] S.C.J. No. 12, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, at 421 
(S.C.C.). See Wade Kenneth Wright, Beyond Umpire and Arbiter: Courts as Facilitators of 
Intergovernmental Dialogue in Division of Powers Cases in Canada (S.J.D. Thesis, Columbia 
University, 2014) [unpublished]; Warren J. Newman, “The Promise and Limits of Cooperative 
Federalism as a Constitutional Principle” in B. Berger & S. Lawrence, eds., Constitutional Cases 2015 
(2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d) 67. 
39 Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, 2007 SCC 22, at para. 24 (S.C.C.), 
affg [2005] A.J. No. 21 (Alta. C.A.). 
40 Reference re Securities Act, supra, note 15, at paras. 132-33. 
41 Hugo Cyr, “Autonomy, Subsidiarity, Solidarity: Foundations of Cooperative Federalism” 
(2014) 23 Const. Forum Const. 20. 
42 NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services Society v. B.C. Government and Service Employees’ 
Union, [2010] S.C.J. No. 45, 2010 SCC 45, at para. 67 (S.C.C.), affg [2008] B.C.J. No. 1611 (B.C.C.A.). 
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abstraction of an allocation of powers to different levels of government 
— is neither cooperative nor uncooperative. It just is. Describing 
federalism as cooperative personifies it with human characteristics — 
acts of agency, kindness, consideration, mutuality, respect. It animates 
the inert with life while reframing the concrete (federalism) with an 
evocative external image (cooperation). As Lakoff and Johnson explain, 
personifications, as a subset of metaphor, “make sense of phenomena in 
the world in human terms — terms that we can understand on the basis 
of our own motivations, goals, actions, and characteristics.”43 The word 
metaphor is itself metaphorical. Derived from the Greek, metaphor 
means “to ferry over” — and the transportation of meanings is what an 
apt metaphor can so brilliantly and succinctly accomplish.44 “[T]he 
greatest thing by far,” Aristotle writes, “is to be a master of metaphor. … 
since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in 
dissimilars.”45 Metaphor does more than simply recognize existing 
similarities. More powerfully, in many cases “the metaphor creates the 
similarity”.46 A constitution, quite obviously, is not a tree at all, but it 
seems more like a living tree after it is called one. This power of making 
meaning means that, in the constitutional context, metaphors must be 
approached with care. This is not a call to dispense with constitutional 
metaphors, but rather to fully respect them. To do so means paying closer 
attention to how they operate, and the role of their components in 
constitutional analysis. 
In addition to noting the ubiquity and salience of metaphor, 
philosophers and literary theorists have long recognized that metaphors 
consist of two essential parts. These two parts have gone by a variety of 
labels, perhaps most influentially I.A. Richards’ description of the tenor 
and vehicle.47 The tenor operates as the principal subject, the vehicle as 
the object or idea of comparison. In constitutional metaphor, a particular 
constitutional provision or feature (or, at times, the entire constitution 
itself) serves as the tenor, the image of comparison as the vehicle. In the 
metaphor that our Constitution is a living tree, the Constitution is the 
tenor and the tree is the vehicle. The danger foreseen by Lord Sankey 
                                                                                                                       
43 Lakoff & Johnson, supra, note 21, at 34. 
44 Stephen Adams, Poetic Designs: An Introduction to Meters Verse Forms and Figures of 
Speech (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2003), at 133. 
45 Aristotle, Poetics (London: Aeterna Press, 2015), at 22. 
46 Max Black, “Metaphor” (1954-55) 55 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 273, at 285 
[emphasis in original]. 
47 Richards, supra, note 20, at 97. 
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was that in subsequent cases, lawyers and judges would come to focus on 
the meaning, scope and import of the vehicle at the expense of the tenor. 
Imagine a case in which in trying to determine whether a particular 
enactment was part of the Constitution, a court became concerned with 
whether or not the enactment metaphorically resembled the branch of a 
tree. Cooperation may be a useful way to understand the ideal qualities 
of federalism, but judges will fall into error if, in attempting to apply  
the division of powers, they insist on a precondition of cooperation.  
To do so switches the constitutional focus from tenor to vehicle. As I have 
argued, constitutional metaphors are indispensable for understanding 
constitutional text, but it is essential that the separation between text and 
its guiding metaphorical images remain robust. Judicial review, as La 
Forest J. reminded, “is politically legitimate only insofar as it involves 
the interpretation of an authoritative constitutional instrument” and not, 
application of the vehicle of a constitutional metaphor.48 
III. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM IN QUEBEC V. CANADA 
The nature and adjudicative impact of cooperative federalism occupies a 
central place in the decisions at all levels of court in Quebec’s constitutional 
challenge to Parliament’s Ending the Long-gun Registry Act.49 At the outset 
of the constitutional analysis in the trial decision, Blanchard J. writes that “to 
facilitate ‘cooperative federalism’, the constitutional boundaries underlying 
the division of powers must prevail so as not to erode the constitutional 
balance between federal and provincial powers.”50 Noting that in the 
Secession Reference the Supreme Court held that “underlying constitutional 
principles may in certain circumstances give rise to substantial legal 
obligations, which constitute substantial limitations upon government 
action,” Blanchard J. opined that “one of the keys to resolving this dispute 
can be found in the answer to the following question: Does the fact that 
Canada has announced that it wishes to prevent Quebec from using the 
[federal gun registry] data violate these principles?”51 Drawing particular 
attention to statements in Parliament by Ministers of the Crown, including 
the Prime Minister, indicating an “avowed intention” to prevent other levels 
                                                                                                                       
48 Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, 
[1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 315 (S.C.C.), revg [1995] M.J. No. 170 (Man. C.A.). 
49 S.C. 2012, c. 6. 
50 Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [2012] J.Q. no 8319, 2012 
QCCS 4202, at para. 53 (Que. S.C.), revd [2013] J.Q. no 6676 (Que. C.A.). 
51 Id., at paras. 95, 97. 
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of government to establish gun registries, the trial judge found a direct 
interference with the principles of cooperative federalism. “Since the 
Supreme Court of Canada has urged Canadian legislators to adopt a flexible 
and cooperative approach to federalism based on pragmatic lawmaking”, 
Blanchard J. concludes, “it is clear that … Parliament has acted in direct 
opposition to this teaching.”52 Cooperative federalism, in Blanchard J.’s 
handling, provides more than interpretive guidance, but also supplies direct 
substantive obligations. On the basis of the breach of those obligations, as 
well as his characterization of the pith and substance of the federal 
legislation as a colourable invasion of property and civil rights, Blanchard J. 
found the provision of the federal enactment purporting to destroy firearms 
records from Quebec ultra vires and of no force and effect. He ordered 
Canada to transfer specific gun registry data to Quebec within 30 days. 
A unanimous bench of five judges of the Quebec Court of Appeal 
allowed the appeal.53 In doing so, the Court of Appeal took an entirely 
different view of the role of cooperative federalism in division of powers 
cases. On the more direct question of the legislation’s constitutionality, 
the Court of Appeal held that the repeal of valid federal legislation and 
the destruction of records created under it must, by definition, equally 
fall within federal jurisdiction. “Since the impugned Act does nothing 
more than abolish a scheme that was constitutionally valid”, the Court 
reasoned, “it cannot encroach any further on provincial jurisdiction than 
did the statute that created and implemented the scheme in the first 
place.”54 That such federal action was impolitic, wasteful and 
inconvenient to a province was of no constitutional moment. “If there is 
a price to be paid for enacting a statute that could engender pointless 
costs for another level of government”, the judges held, “it is to be paid 
at the polling booths and not before the courts.”55 The Court specifically 
rejected the trial judge’s conception and use of cooperative federalism. 
“As a principle of interpretation”, the Court held, “it cannot, in itself, 
                                                                                                                       
52 Id., at para. 144. “The Court emphasizes that it is not rendering a political judgment”, 
Blanchard J. clarified in anticipation of criticism, “as it has no authority to do so. Rather, it states a 
legal observation based on Canadian constitutional legal rules and principles” (at para. 145). 
53 Canada (Attorney General) v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2013] J.Q. no 6676, 2013 
QCCA 1138 (Que. C.A.), affd [2015] S.C.J. No. 14 (S.C.C.). 
54 Id., at para. 49. 
55 Id., at para. 35. Echoing Major J.’s admonishment a decade earlier that “the appellants’ 
arguments fail to recognize that in a constitutional democracy such as ours, protection from 
legislation that some might view as unjust or unfair properly lies not in the amorphous underlying 
principles of our Constitution, but in its text and the ballot box.” British Columbia v. Imperial 
Tobacco Canada Ltd, [2005] S.C.J. No. 50, 2005 SCC 49, at para. 66 (S.C.C.), affg [2004] B.C.J. No. 1007 
(B.C.C.A.). 
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modify the division of powers. … Only the provisions of the Constitution 
Act, 1867 dividing areas of jurisdiction between Parliament and the 
provincial legislatures can ground a judgment of constitutional invalidity 
based on the division of powers.”56 For the Quebec Court of Appeal, 
cooperative federalism might be an important principle of Canadian 
constitutional law, but that did not transform it into a set of enforceable 
constitutional obligations, the breach of which gave rise to constitutional 
remedies. 
Quebec’s appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada also turned on the 
Court’s understanding of cooperative federalism and its limits. The 
majority and dissenting judgments part company on the extent and 
ramifications of the federal-provincial partnership involved in the federal 
gun registry, but also set out two distinct visions of cooperative federalism 
and its operation in Canadian constitutional law. My focus is on the latter 
divergence. I begin with the dissent authored by LeBel, Wagner and 
Gascon JJ. joined in concurrence by Abella J. The dissent is notable for 
unifying all three of the Court’s members appointed from Quebec, a fact 
which might suggest a greater and more troubling schism along provincial 
lines if it were not for the unanimous judgment of five judges of the 
Quebec Court of Appeal which disagreed with them. Emphasizing that the 
degree of administrative integration and cooperation among governments 
in the creation, maintenance, and use of the long gun registry created a 
“novel circumstance”, the dissent held that “our analysis must be guided 
by the Constitution’s unwritten principles”, particularly, “the principle of 
federalism and its modern form — co-operative federalism.”57 Given that 
cooperative federalism “reflects the realities of an increasingly complex 
society that requires the enactment of coordinated federal and provincial 
legislative schemes”, the dissenting judges stated that “our courts must 
protect such schemes both when they are implemented and when they are 
dismantled.”58 In short, if cooperative federalism made the scheme 
possible in the first place, then only by complying with the spirit of 
cooperative federalism may such an arrangement be repealed. 
Although the dissent ultimately employed a traditional division of 
powers analysis utilizing — pith and substance, classification and the 
ancillary doctrine to ground its decision,59 significant portions of the 
                                                                                                                       
56 Id., at para. 52. 
57 Supra, note 10, at para. 151. 
58 Id., at paras. 148, 152. 
59 See Paul Daly, “Dismantling Regulatory Structures: Canada’s Long-Gun Registry as 
Case Study” (2014) 33 N.J.C.L. 169. 
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judgment appear to join with the trial judge in elevating cooperative 
federalism into a substantive constitutional obligation: to hold governments 
to a constitutional duty to act cooperatively. The precise parameters of that 
obligation and its requirements are somewhat unclear, but the dissent states 
that “the dismantling of a partnership … must be carried out in a manner that 
is compatible with the principle of federalism that underlies our 
Constitution.”60 Elaborating slightly, the dissent suggests that “a co-
operative scheme from which both the federal and provincial governments 
benefit cannot be dismantled unilaterally by one of the parties without taking 
the impact of such a decision on its partner’s heads of power into account.”61 
This obligation attaches even in situations, as in this case, without the 
presence of an interlocking legislative scheme where both levels of 
government are exercising valid legislative authority under the double aspect 
doctrine.  
In what follows I raise several concerns with using cooperative 
federalism in this manner, not the least of which is the absence of authority 
for such obligations in the division of powers themselves. In addition to 
diverting judicial attention from constitutional text to constitutional 
metaphor, the principle of cooperative federalism provides no workable or 
predictable standard of enforcement and muddies the separation of powers. 
Ironically, its increased use judicially may also have the perverse incentive 
of reducing cooperation politically. 
Judges will not be able to adjudicate in any predictable fashion a 
constitutional duty to act cooperatively, and will tend to extend them beyond 
their appropriate role under the separation of powers.62 What actions give 
rise to the breach of the duty of cooperative federalism or are required to 
satisfy its terms? The answer to either question is uncertain and probably 
unknowable. The dissent only suggests that legislatures take “into account 
the reasonably foreseeable consequences” on the other level of government, 
or that governments “be aware of the impact of that legislation or provision 
on the other partner’s exercise of its powers” in order to be judged to have 
                                                                                                                       
60 Quebec v. Canada, supra, note 10, at para. 153 [emphasis added]. 
61 Id., at para. 154. 
62 There is, perhaps, a telling slip in para. 154, supra, note 10, of the dissent. In noting the 
necessity of protecting the “constitutional balance that protects the principle of federalism”, the 
dissenters write: “The concern here is not to alter the separation of powers in our Constitution 
through the application of co-operative federalism, but to ensure that it is respected.” I think it 
almost certain that the sentence should refer to the “division of powers” rather than the separation of 
powers. The irony is that the strict judicial enforcement of cooperative federalism while potentially 
solicitous of a particular vision of federalism does undermine the separation of powers, an equally 
crucial unwritten principle of Canadian constitutional law. 
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acted cooperatively.63 Constitutional standards overly reliant on other 
(equally imprecise) abstractions tend not to yield predictable or satisfying 
jurisprudence, as the experience with employing the infringement of human 
dignity within the legal test for equality rights under section 15 of the 
Charter illustrated.64 Judging whether such standards are met proves 
unworkably subjective, and, more problematically in this instance, will 
compel judges to evaluate an array of political behaviours, policy choices 
and intergovernmental relationships best left to the exclusive domain of the 
political process. 
Faced with the prospect of being unable to alter or repeal a scheme 
judged to trigger these additional constitutional duties, governments may 
choose to forgo administrative cooperation in the first place to avoid 
limitations on their future legislative capacities.65 Although the dissent 
proceeds on the assumption that such cooperative arrangements are rare, 
information sharing and coordination across government administrative 
schemes seems only likely to increase. Indeed, the rise of cooperative 
federalism as an interpretive doctrine was premised on making such 
coordination possible in order to deal with the overlapping realities of 
many subjects demanding legislative attention. Perhaps in its particulars 
the federal gun registry was “novel”, but the regulation of firearms is 
hardly unique in its engagement of multiple levels of government 
jurisdiction. From health care and education, to transportation and 
scientific research, to labour mobility and environmental standards, it is 
difficult to think of many subjects that do not possess both national and 
local dimensions, and which might not benefit from administrative 
regulation drawing upon multiple levels of government involvement. 
Data collected under the authority of intra vires legislation dealing with 
these subjects will almost always be of use or benefit to the other level of 
government.66 The dissent’s substantive conception of cooperative 
federalism suggests a diminished capacity of government to control the 
data of their valid administrative schemes wherever there has been 
cooperation in collecting it. The dissent raises the prospect of a troubling 
legislative vacuum, a situation in which such data could not be fully 
                                                                                                                       
63 Id., at para. 153. 
64 See R. v. Kapp, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, 2008 SCC 41, at para. 21 (S.C.C.), affg [2006] 
B.C.J. No. 1273 (B.C.C.A.). 
65 Id., at para. 20. 
66 Think of federal information relating to employment collected under s. 91(2A) 
Unemployment insurance, or the vast array of information collected under s. 91(6) The Census and 
Statistics. 
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controlled by either level of government. Cooperative federalism arose 
specifically to deal with the fact of overlapping constitutional powers and 
subjects of governmental concern that spanned both provincial and 
federal jurisdictions. Accordingly, courts developed an approach to 
federalism and its doctrines (pith and substance, paramountcy, ancillary 
and interjurisdictional immunity) which, instead of rigidly policing 
boundaries between levels of government, came to accept the exercise of 
legislative jurisdiction that might have impacts within the other level of 
government’s jurisdiction. The dissent proposes a substantive conception 
of cooperative federalism which transforms its function from enabling 
the exercise of jurisdiction to fundamentally impairing it. 
The majority reasons of Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ. (with support 
from McLachlin C.J.C., and Rothstein and Moldaver JJ.), appear alive to 
several of these concerns. For the majority, cooperative federalism 
describes a fact about concurrency, and exists as a principle that gives 
rise to a permissive flexibility when interpreting the scope of sections 91 
and 92.67 In this view, cooperative federalism is a ripple in the surf of the 
dominant tide of federalism. Suggesting that a different result may attend 
to “a truly interlocking federal-provincial legislative framework”, the 
majority held that nothing in the nature of the particular scheme at issue 
or in cooperative federalism generally impaired the ability of the federal 
government to destroy records created under its legislative authority, 
even though some of those records had been produced with assistance 
from other levels of government.68 “The principle of cooperative 
federalism”, the majority held, “cannot be seen as imposing limits on the 
otherwise valid exercise of legislative competence.”69 In emphasizing 
instead the primacy of the written constitutional text, the majority 
stressed that cooperative federalism could not mandate an obligation on 
governments to cooperate, be cooperative, or prohibit actions which 
might hinder cooperation. Beyond the flexible constitutional strictures 
imposed by sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the 
majority implied, relations between governments (cordial or aggressive, 
magnanimous or obstreperous) were political matters to be executed and 
evaluated by other actors (politicians and public servants, media and 
voters) within Canada’s constitutional culture. Voters can and do reward 
                                                                                                                       
67 Of course, a unanimous Supreme Court has also stressed that a flexible and permissive 
interpretation of the division of powers cannot overwrite the jurisdictional lines that do and must 
exist between the various heads of power: Reference re Securities Act, supra, note 15. 
68 Quebec v. Canada, supra, note 10, at para. 4. 
69 Id., at para. 19. 
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and punish the behaviour of governments, including on the basis of 
perceptions of government relations within the federation. The constitutional 
freedom to act uncooperatively may, in fact, yield the best protection of 
cooperative federalism in the form of electoral punishment and reward 
from the voting public. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is possible that the Supreme Court’s more recent decision in Rogers 
Communications Inc. v. Châteauguay,70 reveals that the gap in the 
approach to cooperative federalism between the majority and the dissent 
may have since narrowed. Writing for a majority of eight justices, 
Wagner and Côté JJ. agreed with Gascon J.’s partially concurring reasons 
that “when the courts apply the various constitutional doctrines, they 
must take into account the principle of co-operative federalism, which 
favours, where possible, the concurrent operation of statutes enacted by 
governments at both levels.”71 Citing Quebec v. Canada, however, the 
majority emphasized that cooperative federalism “can neither override 
nor modify the division of powers itself. It cannot be seen as imposing 
limits on the valid exercise of legislative authority.”72 Justice Gascon 
alone appeared to argue for a more substantive conception of cooperative 
federalism capable of curbing the exercise of jurisdictional authority.73 In 
retrospect, the dissent in Quebec v. Canada may stand as the high-water 
mark in the use of cooperative federalism to reshape the division of 
powers and their constitutional adjudication in its image. 
And yet we would not want to live in a world without constitutional 
metaphors like cooperative federalism. To be governed by the rule of law 
is to live by the power of words and imagination, and the words of the 
Constitution, as we have seen, often take shape and meaning with the use 
of contextual metaphors. Constitutional metaphors serve a functional 
purpose too — to make law memorable, relatable and intelligible, not 
only to its practitioners but to the broader public as well. And, as I have 
                                                                                                                       
70 [2016] S.C.J. No. 23, 2016 SCC 23 (S.C.C.). 
71 Id., at para. 38. 
72 Id., at para. 39. 
73 Id., at para. 93. Reminiscent of the approach adumbrated by the dissent in Quebec v. 
Canada, Gascon J. writes: “If for no other reason than to respect Parliament’s legislative choice to 
require collaboration in the process for determining where to locate radiocommunication equipment, 
it seems to me that it would be appropriate to adopt an analytical approach that favours co-operation 
between municipalities and businesses rather than one that risks making such co-operation difficult 
or impossible” (at para. 110). 
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argued, constitutional metaphors and other external references provide 
judges and political actors with the guidance required to select among 
interpretive alternatives. This is not to say that constitutional metaphors 
are always equally useful or germane. Their emergence and ascendancy, 
like their downfall, reflect moments in time in our constitutional culture 
and law, just as they help to shape and produce that law and culture. Like 
other features in our constitutional life they are contestable and contested, 
shifting and changeable. Particular metaphors will come and go as they 
form, change shape, break up, and recede as winter ice on the lake. 
Cooperative federalism has captured political and legal imaginations 
alike. From Laskin C.J.C.’s initial offhand reference, to its dominant 
position as a guiding principle in division of powers jurisprudence today, 
cooperative federalism appealingly combines several aspirational goals: 
equal and coordinate levels of government, flexible and permissive 
interpretation of the division of powers, and respectful cooperation in 
service of collective goals. Perhaps because of its particular allure we need 
to be careful not to mistake the compass for the map, the constellations for 
the stars, the vehicle for the tenor in our constitutional analysis. As useful 
and necessary as external references are to constitutional navigation, it is 
the text that must continue to define judicially enforced constitutional 
obligations. The Canadian Constitution is, of course, more than inscribed 
words on the page, but its broader life, culture, and principles — its 
underlying ideas and their metaphors — are the avenues of negotiation, 
politics and pluralism of a healthy democracy. “If human rights and 
harmonious relations between cultures are forms of the beautiful”, the poet 
and constitutional scholar Frank Scott wrote, “then the state is a work of 
art that is never finished.”74 Constitutional metaphors are destined to 
remain an integral part of Canada’s constitutional canvas. So too must 
vigilance that they not dominate the painting. 
                                                                                                                       
74 Frank R. Scott, Essays on the Constitution: Aspects of Canadian Law and Politics 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), at ix. 
 
